The following is the translation of an article by Dr Michael Milstein’s the head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University: https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13943293.
The Palestinians describe a tragic historical cycle that was forced upon them, but refrain from admitting that it stems from the strategic choices made by the public and the leadership together, in which the refusal to recognize the connection between cause and effect is prominent.
Nakba Day, observed on May 15, was described this year by many Palestinians as a continuation of their permanent historical destiny, centred on displacement, refugees, carnage and destruction. Some even claimed that the current campaign in Gaza is the great Nakba, the one that surpasses the extent of the harm it inflicted on the Palestinians over the original one from 1948.
However, the similarity between the past and the present is also embodied in many “shadows” that the Palestinians do not deal with, chief among them: the lack of national leadership (in 1948 it was the first to flee, and today it is hidden underground, without dialogue with the public), alongside the permanent gap in the national agenda of order and realistic goals instead of illusions and slogans. And so, the refugee camps continue to serve as a symbol of the Palestinian fate, and they receive a “recent addition” in the form of aid trucks and crowds chasing packages dropped from airplanes.
The tendency towards rapprochement, maintaining total dependence on the world and escaping responsibility and self-criticism are therefore replacing an orderly and unrealized national strategy.
The Palestinians describe a tragic historical cycle that was forced upon them but refrain from admitting that it is the result of the strategic choices made by both the public and the leadership. In this framework, the refusal to recognize the connection between cause and effect (opposition to the partition plan in 1947 and the October 7 massacre that started the current war) stands out, along with adherence to a dichotomous image according to which the Palestinians are eternal victims and Israel is “absolute evil”. All this while avoiding soul-searching and adopting passivity and fatalism in the face of the disasters arising from the national decisions that are being promoted. The tendency towards rapprochement, maintaining total dependence on the world and escaping from responsibility and self-criticism are therefore replacing an orderly and unrealized national strategy.
Years after the Nakba of 1948, a Palestinian national identity exists, but a heavy question mark arises regarding the existence of a Palestinian civil society. This is a collective that so far has not protested the unprecedented disaster brought upon it by Hamas, and large parts of it, as Palestinian public opinion polls show, are in favour of the October 7 attack, support Hamas and refuse to believe that Palestinians have committed war crimes. This is an expression of a long-standing bipolarity: glorification of violent attacks that are wrapped in the heroic terminology of “resistance” and “subjugation”, and on the other hand convergence in rapprochement.
Paradoxically, the strength of the Palestinian national movement outside the Palestinian arena today is greater than that which exists between the river and the sea. From the support demonstrations on the campuses, in fact, the first virtual national movement in the world was born, which serves as a symbol of the Z generation culture. Supporters of the Palestinian struggle adhere to general slogans, identity politics, fashion embodied in the watermelon symbol and wearing a cap, and as little complexity and knowledge as possible. These are embodied, for example, in the understanding of the anti-liberal character of Hamas or in the recognition of the corruption and political oppression that currently characterize the entire Palestinian system.
The war in Gaza evoked memories of the Holocaust and was extinguished from the bottom of the collective consciousness in both communities, along with unprecedented suspicion and hostility. In such a situation it is unlikely to hope for reconciliation. In the background, the difficulty of developing a fruitful dialogue between a community that specializes in self-flagellation and one that largely refuses to recognize the suffering of the “other” and the ability of its members to commit war crimes is intensifying. Between a society adhering to a monolithic and dichotomous narrative of a struggle between angels and devils – to a second where self-criticism and protest against the leaderships, including during wars.
The events of the past week in Rafah illustrate the gap described. The severe injury to Palestinian civilians – apparently caused by a Hamas ammunition explosion and not an IDF attack – was widely reported in Israel and an in-depth investigation into the matter was promoted. Hamas, on the other hand, jumped on the incident as a propaganda asset, and among the Palestinian public there were rather weak doubts about the question of who is responsible for the destruction of the fabric of life that existed until October 7. With no horizon for the end of the suffering, among the bad alternatives on the Palestinian issue, Israel should choose the less bad and more realistic one. The deepening of contact between the nations is the worst, with the potential to lead to a bleeding situation like the one experienced at the Balkans with heavy prices in the political, economic, security and social fields. The necessary way out for two hostile communities with such deep cultural and value differences is physical separation. However, this is accompanied by an acute dilemma in view of the Palestinians’ immaturity for sovereignty, embodied in the fact that when they already experienced it – after the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 – they focused on jihad and not on self-development.
Israel’s leaders are required to settle between the two poles: on the one hand separation and on the other hand painful decisions, but at the same time not to risk existential threats, for example following the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. One of the required lines of thinking is the creation of a physical border, while leaving the gates of the Palestinian entity in the hands of Israel – the Jordan Valley and the Philadelphi corridor on the Egyptian border. This is for an unspecified period of time, during which it is to be hoped, and without erring on the side of fantasy, that a stable and sober Palestinian leadership will be established and the entrenched hostility towards Israel will diminish. Right now the likelihood of such a scenario is clouded, but the very idea is essential to develop a realistic and non-conception based discussion of the kind that tragically shattered on October 7th.
The author is the head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University